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Abstract 
 
This study offers new insights by employing Indonesian data. The uniqueness of 
Indonesian companies is reflected by the common occurrence of ownership 
concentration among a few large families and affiliation with a corporate group in 
which seems nonexistent in many developed countries. With regard to the 
methodology problem, this study uses simultaneous equations model to overcome the 
endogeneity problem in debt-equity study. It is reported that the external block 
ownership has dominant position by having majority control and impact on powerless 
Indonesian managers. The inadequate legal framework for investors’ protection, 
insufficient internal financing and improper development of the capital market occur. 
With regard to this situation, debt-equity choice was widely practiced. There is 
evidence that Indonesian companies relied heavily on loans to finance unrealistic 
rapid corporate expansion. The insignificant relationship between the level of debt 
and tangibility of assets and profitability indicate the appearance of moral hazard 
problem before the crisis. This study points out that the dominant external block 
ownership can have a detrimental effect on the shareholders and debtholders relation. 
It induces the higher cost of debt which is typically described in forms of asset 
substitution or risk shifting problem.  As a result, severe agency conflict occurs is not 
between shareholders and managers as often assumed in the previous studies but 
between shareholders and debtholders.  
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Analisis Empirikal Tentang Pilihan Hutang-Ekuiti Bagi Syarikat-Syarikat di 
Indonesia 
Abstrak 
Kajian ini menyumbangkan pengetahuan yang baru dengan menggunakan data dari 
Indonesia. Khususnya, pilihan di antara hutang dan ekuiti oleh firma Indonesia 
berbeza daripada negara maju. Ini terbukti di dalam konsentrasi pemilikan di antara 
beberapa keluarga terpengaruh dan perhubungan di antara sesuatu kumpulan syarikat 
yang tidak berlaku di negara maju. Berhubung dengan masalah metodologi, kajian ini 
menggunakan model persamaan serentak untuk mengatasi masalah endogeneiti yang 
timbul di dalam setengah kajian ke atas  hutang-ekuiti yang lepas. Ia dilaporkan 
bahawa pemilikan luaran secara blok mempunyai kedudukan yang dominan secara 
kawalan majority dan ini mempengaruhi pengurus Indonesia supaya menjadi tidak 
berwibawa. Undang-undang yang tidak lengkap bagi mempertahankan hak pelabur, 
kekurangan kewangan dalaman dan pasaran saham yang mentah juga berlaku. 
Berhubung dengan keadaan ini,  pilihan hutang-ekuiti diamalkan. Terdapat bukti 
bahawa syarikat di Indonesia bergantung kuat ke atas pinjaman untuk membiayai 
perkembangan corporate pesat dan tidak realistik.  Perhubungan yang tidak signifikan 
di antara tahap hutang dan ketaraan aset dan pendapatan membuktikan kemunculan 
masalah “moral hazard”. Kajian ini membuktikan bahawa pemilikan luaran secara 
blok boleh mempunyai kesan negative ke atas perhubungan di antara pemegang 
saham dan pemberi hutang. Ia mengakibatkan kos hutang yang lebih tinggi yang 
sering disebutkan di dalam bentuk masalah penggantian asset atau pemindahan risiko. 
Oleh sebab ini, masalah agensi yang serius di Indonesia berlaku bukan di antara 
pemegang saham dan pengurus seperti yang diandaikan di negara yang maju tetapi di 
dalam bentuk di antara pemegang saham dan pemberi hutang. 
 xvii
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study  
Debt-equity choice is one of the most important decisions in financing policy. The 
impact of a faulty financing decision on a company could be disastrous as was 
experienced by many South East Asian companies in the 1997 financial crisis. Many 
companies were on the verge of collapsing when the economy changed overnight 
during the crisis (Kim & Mark, 1999). There is an interesting financial phenomenon 
in Indonesian companies with respect to debt-equity choice as reflected by the high 
level of debt and high ownership concentration. 
A number of previous studies on debt-equity choice have assumed firm debt as 
an endogenous variable which in turn is determined by several exogenous variables 
(e.g. Homaifar, Zietz, & Benkato, 1994; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 
1988). A majority of empirical studies employ a model in which the level of debt is 
regressed on a list of explanatory variables by assuming that Fd = ƒ(Xi), where: Fd is 
a measurement of firm debt, and Xi is a vector of explanatory variables (Prasad, 
Green, & Murinde, 2001).  
Prior studies also argued that ownership structure is a function of the level of 
debt and other firm’s variables. These two variables, namely the level of debt, firm 
performance and the ownership structure were used interchangeably as a dependent 
and an independent variable (Setiawan & Taib, 2002b). This is known as endogeneity 
problem or jointly determined problem under the econometric point of view (Greene, 
2000; Gujarati, 2003). 
Studies on capital structure have made great contributions in understanding the 
behaviour of firms with respect to their choice among the use of debt or equity. 
Despite the merits, debt-equity study should be understood critically on the real issues 
in developing countries namely Indonesian companies which are suffering from high 
level of debt and ownership concentration. It should also address to the relevant 
econometric viewpoint such as endogeneity problem.  
 
1.1.1  Financial Phenomenon of Indonesian Companies 
Most Indonesian public listed companies (henceforth Indonesian companies) have 
been substantially financed by credit. As shown in Table 1.1, the debt-equity ratio 
increased from 240.0 in 1993 to 310.0 in 1997 (Husnan, 2001). It indicates that the 
higher debt correlate with the lower return on assets. Similar findings were reported in 
other studies by Claessens, Djankov, and Nenova (2000a), Zhuang, Edwards, Webb, 
and Capulong (2000).   
 
Table 1.1  
Debt to Equity and Firm Performance of Indonesian Companies, 1993 - 1997 
(percent) 
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Debt-to-Equity  240.0 220.0 220.0 230.0 310.0
Return on Equity 12.5 12.0 11.3 10.7 1.1
Return on Assets 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.2 0.6
Source: Husnan (2001). 
 
Concerning ownership structure, empirical evidence show that Indonesian 
companies are characterised by high ownership concentration as reflected by Table 
1.2.  Other studies which employed Indonesian data also reported similar finding 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 1999a; La Porta, Silanes & Shleifer, 1998a; Taridi, 
1999; Zhuang et al., 2000). High ownership concentration has been regarded as one of 
the factors that lead to excessive borrowing behaviour. This in turn can affect 
companies’ performance negatively (Supratikno, 2000). 
A few previous studies of Indonesian companies for examples, Husnan (2001) 
and Taridi (1999) have investigated corporate governance issues in Indonesia. These 
studies indicate that Indonesian companies were suffering from high level of debt and 
ownership concentration. However, the possibilities of the existence of moral hazard 
problem in debt-equity choice were not examined in these studies. Furthermore, prior 
studies only provided descriptive explanation with respect to the association between 
ownership structure and moral hazard problems (Kwik, 1994, 1996; Wibisono, 1998).   
 
Table 1.2 
Ownership Concentration of Indonesian Companies, 1993 - 1997 (percent) 
Shareholder Rank 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average 
Largest 50.5 48.1 47.9 48.5 48.2 48.6
Second Largest 16.6 13.7 14.1 12.0 11.6 13.6
Third Largest 3.0 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.4 3.9
Fourth Largest 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.0
Fifth Largest 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 0.8
Total 72.7 68.3 68.7 67.5 67.5 68.9
Source: Husnan (2001). 
 
These financial phenomenons can be explained using agency theory due to the 
problem may originate from the powerless managers in determining debt and equity 
to finance the investment. Regarding risk aversion assumption (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), when ownership concentration gets bigger, it is possible that moral hazard 
behaviour occurs with shareholders shifting their risks to debtholders.  
It is widely accepted that debt-equity choice is related to ownership structure 
(Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 1999; Chen & Steiner, 1999; Cho, 1998; Xu & Wang, 
1997). To date, there has been no study looking at the relationship between debt-
equity choice and ownership structure, and how it affects the moral hazard problem of 
Indonesian companies. Therefore, this study is going to investigate the 
interdependency among debt-equity choice, ownership structure and firm 
performance. Apart from highlighting how Indonesian companies choose debt or 
equity in financing their investment, it also intends to provide further enlightenment 
in relation to financial behaviour, namely moral hazard problem.  
 
1.1.2  Methodology Issues 
Generally, debt-equity study is associated with three constructs i.e. the level of firm 
debt itself, ownership structure, and firm performance. However, previous studies 
basically take the relationships among these constructs in isolation. Jensen and Smith 
(1985), and Jensen and Warner (1988) conducted prior work that paid attention to the 
links between ownership structure and control.  
A study which discussed the link between corporate strategy and capital 
structure is conducted by Barton and Gordon (1988). Prasad, Bruton and Merikas 
(1997) examined long-run strategic capital structure and argued that if capital 
structure can be identified, a firm could maximize its value by reaching and 
maintaining its financial mix. Meanwhile, Kochhar (1997) studied the relationship 
among strategic assets, capital structure, and firm performance.   
Brailsford et al. (1999) focused on the link between ownership structure and 
debt-equity choice. Ang, Rebel and James (2000), de Jong (1999, 2000) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) conducted the study which concentrated on the relationship 
between debt-equity choice and the agency problem.  
There are several notable studies on the determinant of debt-equity choice 
such as Banerjee, Hesmati, and Wihlborg (1999); Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997), 
Homaifar et al. (1994) and Kester (1986). Studies on the link between investor 
protection, ownership concentration and the level of debt were conducted by La Porta, 
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998a).  
Generally, previous studies used a straightforward regression in analyzing 
determinants of debt-equity choice. Firm debt is normally assumed to be a dependent 
variable in most studies, some examples of studies are those of Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987); Brailsford et al. (1999); Friend and Lang (1988); Kim and 
Sorensen (1986); McConnell and Servaes (1995); Moh’d, Perry, and Rimbey (1998); 
Rajan and Zingales (1995); Titman and Wessels (1988). 
A few studies have argued that ownership structure is a function of the level of 
debt and other firm’s variables (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1988). In other words, the level of firm debt has been used interchangeably 
either as a dependent or an independent variable in previous studies.  
Hence, there is a good reason to believe that if the level of firm debt, the 
ownership structure, as well as the firm performance have been jointly determined, it 
is necessary to look at these variables simultaneously. 
 
1.2  Research Questions 
Indonesia is a developing country with high use of debt and is among the highest 
ownership concentration in the world (Zhuang et al, 2000). It is interesting to see how 
these uniques feature of Indonesian market influence the companies’ choice of debt 
and equity: 
1. How do Indonesian companies finance their investment? 
2. Which block of ownership has prominent role in debt-equity choice? What agency 
problem might occur in relation to the role of the dominant block in debt-equity? 
3. What is the nature of the link between ownership structure and control related to 
debt-equity choice?  
4  How do ownership structure and the level of firm debt have an impact on firm 
performance? 
 
 
1.3 Objective of the Study 
This study tries to examine the Indonesian financial phenomenon particularly 
in debt-equity choice such as: (i) whether the debt-equity choice is related to 
ownership structure. The ownership of the Indonesian companies was concentrated 
among a few large families as opposed to companies in developed countries where 
ownership structure is more dispersed; (ii) whether the affiliation with a corporate 
group has impact to debt-equity choice. The affiliation with a corporate group which 
widely practised in Indonesian companies, as for this phenomenon does not existing 
in many developed countries (see also Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000c).   
 
1.4  Contributions of the Study 
Building on well-known capital structure theories and principal agency model, this 
study attempts to provide some contributions to this field by comparing the findings 
before, during the crisis, and in the overall period. It also provides new insights by 
paying attention to the curvilinear relationship among firm debt, ownership structure, 
and firm performance in an integrated link.  
The application of agency theory will give clear explanations about moral 
hazard problem which might occur related to how firms in Indonesia prefer debt or 
equity to finance their investment. Specifically, these contributions are taken in the 
form of: 
1. Documenting descriptively financial pattern, ownership concentration and 
ownership composition of Indonesian companies, and examine it by 
presenting the type of control and monitoring of Indonesian companies. With 
regard to ownership concentration, this study has two proxies, namely the 
largest external block ownership shareholder (henceforth the largest 
shareholder) and the top five external block ownership shareholders 
(henceforth top five shareholders).  
2. It offers new evidence of moral hazard behaviour when there are sufficient 
condition for the problem to occur for instance, high ownership concentration 
and insufficient legal framework for investors’ protection. It contributs in the 
following ways:  
2.1. Examining the debt-equity choice of Indonesian companies before and 
during the crisis. 
2.2. This study would seek answer as to why Indonesian companies prefer 
debt to equity. 
2.3. This study re-examines debt-equity choice where high ownership 
concentration occurred. 
2.4. This study re-examines the agency problem encountered by Indonesian 
companies. 
3. Contributing methodologically by using simultaneous multiple equations. 
Besides having its advantages, it offers a series of tests provide method which 
has adequate result. 
 
1.5  Outline of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 presents the 
general description of Indonesian companies with emphasis on descriptive results of 
debt-equity choice, ownership structure, control and monitoring in Indonesian 
companies. Chapter 3 presents a review of debt-equity choice theories and how it 
jointly determines the ownership structure and firm performance. This chapter also 
presents the theoretical framework and hypotheses development. Chapter 4 presents 
the methodology and the statistical method and findings.  
There are three chapters concerning examination of the hypotheses i.e. chapter 
5, 6, and 7. Chapter 5 presents the debt-equity choice in Indonesian companies by 
examining the trade-off theory and pecking order theory. Agency problems related to 
the debt-equity choice in Indonesian companies are presented in chapter 6. Chapter 7 
illustrates the link between ownership structure, firm performance and the level of 
debt.  
The last chapter that is chapter 8 presents the conclusion and suggestion for 
the future studies and implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE LEVEL OF DEBT, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, CONTROL AND 
MONITORING OF INDONESIAN COMPANIES 
2.1  Introduction 
This study intends to offer some new evidence with regards to debt-equity choice by 
utilizing data from Indonesian companies. Indonesia is a unique developing country 
characterized by high level of debt, high ownership concentration and insufficient 
legal framework for investor protection. Such characteristic are predicted to give rise 
potential moral hazard problem in debt-equity choice. This chapter will discuss how 
the moral hazard problem might arise in relation to the uniqueness of Indonesian 
companies as stated above.  
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 2.2 
provides the empirical findings that illustrate high level of debt among Indonesian 
companies. It also shows the financing patterns of these companies. Section 2.3 
describes the ownership structure and how controlling mechanism are practised by 
most of Indonesian companies. Section 2.4 presents some related legal frameworks 
such as investor protection and debt recovery process. The discussion is presented in 
section 2.5 and summary of the chapter are presented in section 2.6.     
 
2.2  Description of Financial Patterns and Performance of Indonesian 
Companies 
2.2.1  Indonesian Companies Debt 
Companies have three main sources of capital, i.e. usage of retained earnings, 
borrowing through debt instrument, and issuance of new shares (Megginson, 1997). 
Debt-equity choice is expected to be more complicated in developing countries where 
capital markets do not always work properly (Glen & Pinto, 1994). Prior studies also 
indicated that, the usage of capital markets as a source of external financing in 
Indonesia is very limited. Sartono (2001) argued that the Indonesian capital market is 
not efficient due to the finding that the stocks or bonds issued by the companies are 
not fairly priced. 
Empirical evidence suggests that external financing is important in both 
developed and developing countries. However, the breakdown among the sources of 
capital is not well documented for developing countries compared to those in 
developed countries (Glen & Pinto, 1994).  
 
Table 2.1 
Financing Patterns of Indonesian Companies from 1993 to 2000 (ratio)   
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total Debt to Total Equity 0.99 1.08 1.32 1.46 3.38 20.58 4.08 5.05 
Total Debt to Total Assets 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.52 0.68 0.78 0.77 0.78 
Sources:  Jakarta Stock Exchange, Indonesian Capital Market Directory 1993 to 2001,   
               JSX Watch 2002 as analysed by the author.  
 
To have an idea of how Indonesian companies finance their activities, a 
sample of 75 companies was drawn from Jakarta Stock Exchange. The financing 
patterns as shown in Table 2.1 can provide an insight into how Indonesian companies 
make decisions on debt-equity choice. The ratio of total debt to total assets increased 
from 0.44 in 1993 to 0.78 in 2000, whereas the ratio of total debt to total equity 
increased sharply from 0.99 in 1993 to 5.05 in 2000.  
Another reason why the level of debt increased during the crisis was the 
depreciation of Rupiah. The companies’ foreign currency debt has risen as a result of 
the Rupiah depreciation on companies’ foreign currency debt. This in turn increased 
the debt to equity ratio (Kumar & Debroy, 1999). These empirical findings suggest 
that Indonesian companies are suffering from a higher level of debt. This finding is in 
line with studies conducted by Husnan (2001); Pangestu and Harianto (1999), and 
Taridi (1999. Hereby, it is justifiable that Indonesian companies relied heavily on 
bank loans to finance rapid corporate expansion because internal financing was 
insufficient and the capital market was not developed properly. 
  
2.2.2 Financial Performance of Indonesian Companies 
According to Brealey and Myers (1988), companies will have an incentive to invest 
when Tobin’s Q is greater than 1, and they will stop investing only when it is less than 
1.  As shown in Table 2.2, although Tobin’s Q is higher than 1 in all periods tested 
(1993 to 2000), it declined from 1.55 in 1993 to 1.08 in 1998, and increased to 1.50 in 
1999. In 2000, it declined again to 1.32.  
 
2.3  Ownership Structure, Control and Monitoring of Indonesian Companies 
2.3.1  Ownership Structure on Indonesian Companies 
It is noted that managers’ block ownership (MBO) owns a small percentage of 
outstanding shares in both periods before and during the crisis.  As shown in Table 
2.2, MBO own 11.13 percent of outstanding shares in 1993. It declined to 2.85 
percent in 2000.    
External block ownership has traditionally been defined as the shares owned 
by large non-managerial investor (De Jong, 1999). Similar to Demsetz and Lehn 
(1995), and Husnan (2001), this study measures ownership concentration by the 
proportion of shares owned by the largest shareholders, and the top five shareholders 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1995; Husnan, 2001).  
Table 2.2 
Financial Performance and Ownership Structure of Indonesian Companies,  
1993 - 2000 (percent) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Tobin’s Q 
1.55 1.27 1.15 1.18 1.02 1.08 1.50 1.32
MBO 
11.13 9.77 10.22 8.44 5.50 2.91 2.81 2.85
Largest 
51.80 52.68 53.18 53.84 54.99 55.29 56.04 55.38
Top five 
88.33 89.58 89.06 90.74 92.75 95.58 96.45 96.38
Sources: Jakarta Stock Exchange, Indonesian Capital Market Directory 1993 to 2001,   
               JSX Watch 2002 as analysed by the author. 
 
The top five shareholders are examined as an attempt to investigate whether 
there is a separation of ownership. If the top five shareholders own more than 50 
percent of outstanding shares, it implies that concentration of ownership is high which 
means there is lack of separation. A shareholder(s) who own 50 percent of the shares 
plus one more share can exercise total control of the firm if she or he wants, because 
this individual or group can outvote all the other shareholders combined 
(McConaugby, Mattews, & Fialko, 2001). 
This study reports that the largest shareholder owns 51.80 percent of the 
outstanding shares in 1993, and 55.38 percent shares in 2000. Top five shareholders 
own 88.33 percent shares in 1993 and 96.38 percent shares in 2000. This indicates 
that external block was more dominant during all periods tested.  As the largest 
shareholder owns more than 50 percent of outstanding shares, the findings observed 
for the largest shareholder may be similar to that of the top five shareholders. 
Some empirical evidence show that Indonesian managers seem to own a large 
percentage of shares. However, this does not imply that they have a prominent role in 
debt-equity choice. They own large percentage of share due to their positions as the 
owners of the companies not as a professional manager per se.  
The following examples provide some evidence with respect to the ownership 
of share held by these managers. H. Probosutedjo as the president director of 
Cipendawa Farm Enterprise had 36.76 percent of outstanding shares from 1993 to 
1997. In the Tobacco sector, Putera Sampoerna, as the president director of Hanjaya 
Mandala Sampoerna, had 46.75 percent of outstanding shares in from 1993 to 1996.  
In Plastic & Glass Products, Atmadja Tjiptobiantoro as the president commissioner of 
Berlina Co. Ltd. had 34.30 percent of outstanding shares in 1993 and 1994. Lisjanto 
Tjiptobiantoro as the commissioner had 34.30 percent in 1993 and 1994. Gunawan as 
the president director of Jaya Pari Steel had 15.53 percent of outstanding shares in 
1994 to 2000. Robby Sumampow as one of the board of directors of Brata Mulia had 
22.25 percent of outstanding shares in 1993 to 1996. Hendry Pribadi as a member of 
the board of directors had 14.42 percent in 1993 to 1994.  
This illustration gives an understanding on how dominant family business in 
Indonesian companies is.  In recent studies, the term ‘manager’ refers to the 
professional manager which is not the ‘owner manager’ (McConaugby et al., 2001). 
This evidence in line to Tabalujan’s (2002a) and he pointed out that this phenomenon 
is dominant in the setting of Indonesian companies. 
 
 
In many listed companies, the founders or founding family may decide to retain say, 
70percent of the company stock, while floating off the remaining 30percent to the 
public. The result is that the 30percent spread may be held by say, 5,000 shareholders, 
but the publicly listed companies are still largely owned and controlled by the 
founders or founding family (Tabalujan, 2002a: 11). 
 
This finding leads to a strong prediction that the external block has a dominant 
role in financial decision, and logically managers, as “worker manager” will not have 
the ability to pursue their own agendas of self-gain as assumed in the theories.1  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the ownership concentration in both periods tested. 
However, Taridi (1999) argued that ownership concentration contributed positively to 
the firm performance of Indonesian companies, and he concluded that ownership 
concentration had led to an increase of firm’s debt. 
With regard to agency problem, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that 
ownership concentration has a positive impact on corporate value. Since ownership 
diffusion may lead to increasing power in the hand of managers, in turn it may not 
coincide with the shareholders’ interest. Hence, managers with small percentage of 
ownership fail to maximize shareholder’s wealth because they have an incentive to 
consume perquisites.2 Therefore, the concentrated ownership will minimize agency 
cost by aligning the interest of managers and shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, 
and Lang, 1999c; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In spite of theories substantiating positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance, evidence in developing countries show that high 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the requirement for a listed public companies at least 300 shareholders is not at 
all fulfilled (Tabalujan, 2002a).  Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000b) by using 1996 data, point out 
that the top 15 family groupings in Indonesia controlled a massive 61.7 per cent of the total value of 
listed corporate assets, representing 21.5 per cent of Indonesian Gross Domestic Product. Top 1 family 
grouping controlled 16.6 per cent, and top 5 family grouping control 40.7 per cent of the total value of 
listed corporate assets.  
2 Perquisites are executive fringe benefits such as luxurious offices, use of corporate planes and yachts, personal 
assistants, and general use of business assets for personal purpose (Brigham, 1992). 
concentrated ownership leads to poor corporate governance, due to its leading to 
excessive borrowing behaviour of the companies, which in turn deteriorates corporate 
performance (Taridi, 1999).  Furthermore, when the level of firm’s debt is used as a 
control variable, the relationship between ownership structure and firm’s performance 
may not always be positive.  
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Figure 2.1 Ownership concentration of Indonesian companies before and  
            during the crisis. 
 
2.3.2  Control and Monitoring of Indonesian Companies 
Ownership refers to the term having control over a corporation. It implies that 
someone has the capacity to determine policies and actions of the corporation. It is 
usually defined as;  
….the legal rights over the use, disposal and fruits of the means of production in 
society, and control generally refers to a social relationship in which one party has the 
capacity to influence the decisions or actions of another party even in the presence of 
opposition by the latter (Lim Mah Hui, 1978: 3).  
 
The notion of separation between ownership and control was pioneered by 
Berle and Means (1932) in their book The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
Their basic argument is that modern day corporations have grown so large that few of 
these control a major proportion of the financial assets of the corporate economy. 
 
Table 2.3 
Five Types of Control 
1 Private ownership control 80 per cent or more of the stocks held by an individual or 
a group of business associates. 
2 Majority control 50 – 80 per cent held by such persons 
3 Minority control 20 – 50 per cent stock ownership 
4 Management control Less than 20 per cent stock ownership 
5 Legal device Pyramiding, this involves owning a majority of stocks of 
one corporation, which in turn holds a majority of stocks 
of another-a process, which can be, repeated a number of 
times. 
Source: Berle & Means (1932: 108) 
 
Control is measured simply by one variable, i.e. the percentage of stock owned 
by an individual or group of stockholders. As illustrated in Table 2.3, there are five 
different degrees based on the percentage of ownership held by the shareholders of 
control (Berle & Means, 1932). The focus of this study is to examine the ownership 
structure and debt-equity choice. It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the 
legal device since it is related to the discussion of business groups. Private ownership 
control occurs when a single individual or a small group of associates own all or 
practically all of the outstanding shares (Berle & Means, 1932). While majority 
control means a single individual or a small group  virtually has all of the legal 
powers of control which would be held by a sole owner of the enterprise and in 
particular the power to select the board of directors. Minority control may be said to 
exist when an individual or a small group holds sufficient stock interest to be in a 
position to dominate a corporation through their stock interest (Berle & Means, 1932). 
Lastly, management control means ownership is so widely distributed that no 
individual or small group has even a minority interest large enough to dominate the 
affairs of the company (Berle & Means, 1932).  
 
Table 2.4 
Summary of Type of Controls of 75 Indonesian Companies before the Crisis (The 
Largest Shareholder) 
 Sector N 
Private 
Ownership Majority   Minority   Management
1 Agriculture  1 - 1 - - 
2 Animal Feed 3 - 1 2 - 
3 Mining Services 1 - 1 - - 
4 Food and Beverages 8 - 5 3 - 
5 Tobacco 3 - 2 - 1 
6 Textile Mill Products 5 - 4 1 - 
7 Apparel & Other Textile Product 5 - 4 1 - 
8 Lumber & Wood Products 1 - - 1 - 
9 Paper & Allied Products 3 - 3 - - 
10 Chemical & Allied Products 2 - 1 1 - 
11 Adhesive 3 - 1 2 - 
12 Plastics & Glass Products 4 1 2 1 - 
13 Cement 3 - 1 2 - 
14 Metal & Allied Products 8 1 1 6 - 
15 Cables 6 - 4 2 - 
16 Electric & Electronic Equipment 4 - 2 2 - 
17 Automotive & Allied Products 5 - 2 2 1 
18 Photographic Equipment 2 - 2 - - 
19 Pharmaceuticals 5 - 5 - - 
20 Consumer Goods 3 1 1 1 - 
  75 3 43 27 2 
 Percentage 100 4 57.33 36 2.66 
Sources: Jakarta Stock Exchange, Indonesian Capital Market Directory 1993 to 2001,                 
JSX Watch 2002 as analysed by the author. 
 
As shown in Table 2.4, before the crisis, 3 (three) companies applied a private 
ownership control. The company, which applies a private ownership control for the 
largest shareholder is Igar Jaya in Plastic and Glass Products sector, Unilever 
Indonesia in Consumer Goods sector, and Texmaco Perkasa Engineering in 
Machinery sector (Table A.14 in Appendix A reported a detail finding).  
 
Table 2.5 
Summary of Type of Controls of 75 Indonesian Companies during the Crisis (The 
Largest Shareholder) 
 Sector N 
Private 
Ownership Majority   Minority  Management
1 Agriculture  1 - 1 - - 
2 Animal Feed 3 - 2 1 - 
3 Mining Services 1 - 1 - - 
4 Food and Beverages 8 - 7 1 - 
5 Tobacco 3 - 3 - - 
6 Textile Mill Products 5 - 2 3 - 
7 Apparel & Other Textile Products 5 - 4 1 - 
8 Lumber & Wood Products 1 - - 1 - 
9 Paper & Allied Products 3 - 3 - - 
10 Chemical & Allied Products 2 - 1 1 - 
11 Adhesive 3 - 1 2 - 
12 Plastics & Glass Products 4 - 3 1 - 
13 Cement 3 - 2 1 - 
14 Metal & Allied Products 8 - 2 6 - 
15 Cables 6 - 4 2 - 
16 Electric & Electronic Equipment 4 - 3 1  
17 Automotive & Allied Products 5 1 2 1 1 
18 Photographic Equipment 2 - 2 - - 
19 Pharmaceuticals 5 - 5 - - 
20 Consumer Goods 3 1 2  - 
  75 2 50 22 1 
 Percentage 100 2.66 66.66 29.33 1.33 
Sources: Jakarta Stock Exchange, Indonesian Capital Market Directory 1993 to 2001,                
JSX Watch 2002 as analysed by the author. 
 
Majority control is noted in 43 companies, and minority control in 27 
companies.  Only 2 (two) Indonesian companies applied management control and the 
companies were Hanjaya Mandala Sampurna in Tobacco sector and Brata Mulia in 
Automotive and Allied Product sector. 
Similar pattern was observed during the crisis. Table 2.5 illustrates that there 
are 2 (two) companies applied a private ownership. Those companies are Indospring 
in Automotive and Allied Products sector and Unilever Indonesia in Consumer Goods 
sector. It reported that 50 companies applied majority control. The number of 
companies with minority control was 22 and only 1 (one) company applied a 
management control. 
Based on this evidence, it can be concluded that Indonesian companies are 
suffering from high ownership concentration with a majority control.  The ownership 
composition is reported in Table 2.6. Before the crisis, individuals only owned of 3.93 
percent of the outstanding shares, while, manager owned 10.69 percent of the 
outstanding shares. The lowest percentage owned by the state was 1.84 percent of the 
outstanding shares, and the highest percentage owned by institutions was 38.72 
percent of the outstanding shares.  
Institutions had majority control on Agriculture sector (68.86), Lumber & 
Wood Products (79.88), Paper and Allied Products (70.85), Chemical & Allied 
Products (54.20) sector. Foreign institution has a majority control in Mining Services 
(78.71), and Pharmaceuticals (56.29) sectors. Managers had management control in 
all sectors except in the Consumer Goods (29.37) and Adhesive sector (38.49) in 
which they had minority control. The state only had minority control in the Cement 
sector (31.91). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 
Summary of Ownership Composition, 1993 - 1996  
 
Sector 
Ownership Compositions (percent)  
 Individual Manager State Institutions Public Foreign Total 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean  
1 Agriculture  0.55 1.05 0.00 68.86 29.55 0.00 100.00 
2 Animal Feed 5.83 17.50 0.00 41.13 23.12 12.42 100.00 
3 Mining Services 1.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 78.71 100.00 
4 Food and Beverages 0.81 9.51 3.75 44.41 24.41 17.11 100.00 
5 Tobacco 13.42 18.41 0.00 26.36 17.97 23.83 100.00 
6 Textile Mill Product 0.55 6.84 0.00 26.92 27.73 37.97 100.00 
7 Apparel & Other Textile P 1.14 3.46 0.00 49.57 32.01 13.82 100.00 
8 Lumber & Wood Product 0.00 7.98 0.00 79.88 12.14 0.00 100.00 
9 Paper & Allied Product 0.05 0.00 0.00 70.85 19.59 9.51 100.00 
10 Chemical & Allied Products 2.92 8.97 0.00 54.20 30.40 3.50 100.00 
11 Adhesive 7.37 38.49 0.00 32.57 21.56 0.00 100.00 
12 Plastics & Glass Product 8.63 18.87 0.00 34.67 37.83 0.00 100.00 
13 Cement 0.00 0.00 31.65 34.21 31.91 2.23 100.00 
14 Metal & Allied Product 4.17 14.49 0.00 36.38 28.93 16.03 100.00 
15 Cable 17.00 3.49 0.83 40.08 27.62 10.98 100.00 
16 Electric & Electronic Equipment 4.00 8.79 0.26 36.73 38.87 11.34 100.00 
17 Automotive & Allied Product 4.19 17.70 0.00 48.20 29.92 0.00 100.00 
18 Photographic Equipment 4.00 8.79 0.26 36.73 38.87 11.34 100.00 
19 Pharmaceuticals 0.75 0.00 0.00 11.40 31.56 56.29 100.00 
20 Consumer Goods 1.85 29.37 0.00 1.28 23.06 44.45 100.00 
 Average 3.93 10.69 1.84 38.72 27.35 17.48 100.00 
Sources: Jakarta Stock Exchange, Indonesian Capital Market Directory 1993 to 2001,                 
JSX Watch 2002 as analysed by the author. 
 
Table 2.7 reports the ownership composition during the crisis. In this period, 
managers owned 3.74 percent of the outstanding shares. Institutions owned 41.41 
percent of the outstanding shares, and the public, 29.91 percent of the outstanding 
shares. With regard to the type of control, Institution have majority control in 
Agriculture (60.46), Animal Feed (51.18), Lumber and Wood Products (68.36), Paper 
and Allied Products (63.45), Chemical and Allied Products (60.40), Adhesive (59.50), 
and Automotive and Allied Product (61.04) sector. Foreign institutions have a 
majority control in Mining Services (79.57), and the Pharmaceuticals (57.87) sector. 
Table 2.7 
Summary of Ownership Composition, 1997 - 2000  
  Ownership Compositions (percent)  
 Sector Individual Manager State Institutions Public Foreign Total 
  Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean  
1  Agriculture   0.09 0.70 0.00 60.46 37.18 1.57 100.00 
2  Animal Feed  2.47 4.38 0.00 51.18 32.54 9.44 100.00 
3  Mining Services  0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 79.57 100.00 
4  Food and Beverages  0.06 0.83 3.50 38.09 31.88 25.64 100.00 
5  Tobacco  1.62 0.80 0.00 38.23 30.29 29.06 100.00 
6  Textile Mill Product  0.89 5.48 0.00 24.73 28.24 40.65 100.00 
7  Apparel & Other Textile P  0.67 1.23 0.00 46.01 29.03 23.06 100.00 
8  Lumber & Wood P  0.00 7.97 0.00 68.36 17.50 6.18 100.00 
9  Paper & Allied Product  0.05 0.00 0.00 63.45 31.55 4.95 100.00 
10  Chemical & Allied Products  0.00 0.00 0.00 60.40 36.09 3.51 100.00 
11  Adhesive  0.08 6.62 0.00 59.50 32.70 1.09 100.00 
12  Plastics & Glass Product  4.36 5.75 0.00 48.98 38.34 2.58 100.00 
13  Cement  2.42 0.00 26.68 36.42 27.28 7.20 100.00 
14  Metal & Allied Product  4.36 7.07 0.00 37.50 21.31 29.76 100.00 
15  Cable  1.19 1.13 0.00 45.21 30.05 22.42 100.00 
16  Electric & Electronic Equipment  3.20 7.89 0.00 26.98 43.35 18.58 100.00 
17  Automotive & Allied Product  0.76 10.88 0.00 61.04 22.93 4.39 100.00 
18  Photographic Equipment  3.20 7.89 0.00 26.98 43.35 18.58 100.00 
19  Pharmaceuticals  0.00 0.00 0.00 15.40 26.73 57.87 100.00 
20  Consumer Goods  2.46 6.12 5.82 19.38 17.94 48.28 100.00 
  Average  1.42 3.74 1.80 41.41 29.91 21.72 100.00 
Sources: Jakarta Stock Exchange, Indonesian Capital Market Directory 1993 to 2001,   
               JSX Watch 2002 as analysed by the author. 
 
2.4  The Legal Framework for Investor Protection in Indonesia  
Investor protection is related to security. In traditional finance of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), it is recognized by their cash flows (La Porta et al., 1998a). Debt has a 
fixed promised stream of interest payment. It entitles creditors to the power, for 
example to repossess collateral when the company fails to make promised payments.  
Equity entitles its holder to receive dividends, and typically gives their owner 
the right to vote for directors of the companies. Shareholders receive dividends 
because they can vote out the directors who do not pay them. Without these rights, 
investors would not be able to get paid, and therefore firms would find it harder to 
raise external finance. These rights depend on the legal rules of the jurisdictions in 
which securities are issued. In general, commercial laws come from two broad 
traditions (La Porta et al., 1998a): 
1. Common law, which is English in origin 
2. Civil law, which is derived from Roman law. Within the civil tradition there 
are only three major families that modern commercial laws originate from: (i) 
French, (ii) German, and (iii) Scandinavian. 
Company law is concerned with the legal relations between corporate insiders 
(members of the corporation, i.e., shareholders and directors), and the corporation 
itself. It is known as the shareholder’s rights. The legal relation between the 
corporation and certain outsiders, particularly creditors, is known as creditor’s rights.  
Indonesia is under the French-civil-law reflected poor investor protection. 
Companies in countries with poor investor protection have more concentrated 
ownership of their shares due to the following reasons: 
1. Large, or even dominant, shareholders who monitor the managers might need to 
own more capital, ceteris paribus, to exercise their control rights and thus to avoid 
being expropriated by managers. 
2. When they are poorly protected, small investors might be willing to buy corporate 
shares only at such low prices that make it unattractive for corporations to issue 
new shares to the public. 
 
2.4.1  Creditor’s Rights 
With regard to Indonesia, bankruptcy and moratorium fall under the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1906 (Staatsblad 1905 No. 217 juncto Staatsblad 1906 No. 348), the Company 
Law of 1995 (Undang-Undang No 1 – 1995 tentang Perseroan Terbatas), and 
Bankruptcy law of 1998 (Undang-Undang No. 4 Th. 1998, Perpu No.1 Th. 1998).  
The Act is aimed at giving importance to creditors and does not allow debtors 
to continue with the original business, which is deemed insolvent. It applies to both 
private companies (domestic and foreign) as well as state enterprises (Hussain & 
Wihlborg 1999). The important component of the law is that in order to file for 
bankruptcy the debtor must be liable to two or more creditors.  
(Article 1 of Perpu. No. 1 Th 1998): 
Debitur yang mempunyai dua atau lebih kreditur dan tidak membayar sedikitnya satu 
utang yang telah jatuh waktu dan dapat ditagih, dinyatakan pailit dengan keputusan 
Pengadilan yang berwewenang sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 2, baik atas 
permohonannya sendiri, maupun atas permintaan seorang atau lebih krediturnya. 
 
(A debtor who has two or more creditors and fails to pay at least one due and collectable 
debt, will be declared bankrupt by the court as stated in Chapter 2, either by self request 
or at the request of one or more creditors) 
 
The judicial process in Indonesia is considered unpredictable due to the 
cultural and political influences the actual insolvency procedures (Hussain & 
Wihlborg, 1999). Both creditors and debtors seldom resort to actual court proceedings 
at time of distress.3   
Table 2.8 illustrates the comparison of processes for debt recovery between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. In this evaluation, the score which is close to 3 indicate that 
Indonesia suffered from high cost, difficulties, inefficient, and very slow process. On 
                                                 
3 Hussain and Wihlborg (1999) studied the process of debt recovery in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. The summary of processes evaluation for debt recovery based on 
quantified responses obtained from the study conducted by the Asian Development Bank (1998). Lines 
1 – 7 related to the cost, efficiency, and speed of various procedures are the responses by the legal 
practitioners on the questionnaires to the specific questions, of either of the following: a) low of cost 
(not expensive), expensive, very expensive; b) easy, difficult, very difficult; c) very efficient, efficient, 
inefficient; d) quick, slow, very slow. 
the other hand, Malaysia has a low cost, easy, very efficient, and quick process as the 
score is close to 1.25.  
Table 2.8 
Summary Evaluation of Processes for Debt Recovery 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
1 = low cost (or not expensive), easy, very efficient, quick; 3= very expensive, very difficult, 
inefficient and very slow. 
1 Process for acquiring security (collateral) over land 2.75 1.25 
2 Process for acquiring security over other property 2.75 1.25 
3 Process for enforcement of security over land 3 1.25 
4 Process for enforcement of security over other 
property. 
2.5 1.25 
5 Process for debt collection 2.5 1.25 
6 Process for winding up insolvent corporation 2.5 2 
7 Process for reorganization / restructuring 2.5 2 
8 Time for winding up 4-6 months 6 – 12 months 
9 Time for formal organization 12 – 18 months 8 – 12 months 
10 Time for informal workout 4 – 8 months 2 – 4 months 
11 Incidence of bankruptcy / liquidation Very low High 
12 Incidence of reorganization / restructuring N/A High 
Workout preferred because: 
13 Bankruptcy procedures are a real alternative Adverse effect Yes 
14 Better outcome that under formal procedures no Yes 
Predictability of positive outcome of:                        1 = very high; 5 very low. 
15 Process for security enforcement: other than land 5 2 
16 Process for security enforcement; other than land 5 2 
17 Judicial handling of security enforcement 5 2 
18 Judicial handling of debt collection 5 2 
19 Judicial handling of bankruptcy/liquidation 5 2 
20 Judicial handling of rehabilitation 5 3 
Source: Asian Development Bank, Local Study of insolvency Law Regime (1998), cited from 
Hussain & Wihlborg (1999: 13). 
 
Lines 1 – 7 relate to the cost, efficiency, and speed of various procedures.  The 
process for acquiring security or collateral, process for enforcement, time for workout, 
and incidence of reorganization or liquidation are related to lines 15 – 20. Judicial 
handling from the creditor’s point of view is evaluated in lines 17 – 20. According to 
Hussain & Wihlborg’s (1999) study, Malaysia provides the strongest protection to 
creditors during insolvency while Indonesia the weakest.  
